CONTRIBUTIONS OF RACIAL-ETHNIC RECLASSIFICATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROCESSES TO INDIGENOUS POPULATION RESURGENCE

The Case of Brazil*

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Abstract: In many Latin American countries, indigenous populations have recently exhibited rapid growth. Many scholars recognize that this indigenous population resurgence is due to a combination of demographic processes, such as births, deaths, and migration, as well as changing racial-ethnic identities. However, there is little quantitative data verifying the relative importance of these two types of processes for indigenous population growth. We seek to fill this gap by quantifying the relative contribution of both mechanisms in Brazil’s indigenous population resurgence. Our findings indicate that during the 1990s, race-ethnic reclassification was more important than demographic processes. This varied regionally, in that identity change was most important in northeastern and southeastern Brazil. These findings bear implications regarding indigenous movements, identity politics, and prospective indigenous population growth in Brazil and elsewhere.

INTRODUCTION

In many countries of Latin America, an intriguing trend began during the twentieth century and has, in recent years, gained momentum: indigenous populations, long in decline, have been growing. In much of Latin America, this indigenous population resurgence has taken place in a complicated political context involving democratization, the collapse

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of nation-building projects that promised racial inclusion, the failure of class-based movements to deliver greater social equality, debates over citizenship rights, and the emergence of “new” social movements struggling to overcome social exclusion. In this context, indigenous movements have become influential by contesting race and class hierarchies as well as monocultural definitions of national identity, which constitute obstacles to realizing full citizenship rights for indigenous peoples. One of the principal accomplishments of indigenous movements has been to change the legal, symbolic, and material meanings of indigenous identity. Indeed, identity politics have prompted ostensibly nonindigenous people to reclassify their race-ethnicity and self-identify as indigenous. Consequently, Latin American scholars increasingly recognize that indigenous population growth is fueled not merely by demographic processes, such as fertility, mortality, and migration, but also by the identity politics of indigenous movements that foster indigenous resurgence via racial-ethnic reclassification.

There is, however, little quantitative analysis beyond localized case studies to verify the scope of racial-ethnic reclassification. Nor are there comparisons of the relative numerical importance of demographic processes and identity change when accounting for indigenous population resurgence. As a result, scholars, policy makers, and activists involved with indigenous matters have only a vague sense of what the future holds in terms of indigenous populations in Latin America. Without estimates of the relative importance of demographic processes and racial-ethnic reclassification, it is difficult to plan for how large the indigenous population is likely to become and to determine whom this population is apt to contain. To address this gap, we quantitatively evaluate demographic processes and racial-ethnic reclassification for indigenous population resurgence in Brazil. A finding that racial-ethnic reclassification is more important than demographic processes for indigenous population change in Brazil would bear implications for the rest of Latin America, given the shared context of persistent social exclusion despite political democratization, which has intensified struggles by many subaltern groups seeking full citizenship rights, as via identity politics.

HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXTS

Indigenous Population Decline and Resurgence in Latin America

Estimates of pre-Columbian indigenous populations in what is now Latin America range from 10 million to more than 100 million (Denevan 1976), though these figures have been disputed (Henige 1998). However, there is widespread agreement about the demographic consequences of European contact for indigenous peoples. Disease, warfare, and enslave-
ment decimated indigenous populations during the sixteenth century (Cook 1998; Sánchez-Albornoz 1974; Verano and Ubelaker 1992). By the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century, indigenous populations had reached their historical lows in much of Latin America (Lovell and Lutz 1995).

Aside from mortality, indigenous population decline can also be attributed to changes in race-ethnic identity (Boccara 2002; López 1995). Tribal groups were divided, moved, and resettled, and indigenous people were forced to adapt to a colonial society largely imposed by Europeans. In the process, indigenous people experienced persecution, whether due to racism, devaluation of indigenous culture, or missionary zeal to convert heathens. In addition, as indigenous men and women coupled with Africans and Europeans, racial-ethnic mixing (mestizaje) resulted. A consequence of these processes was that indigenous people were often assigned (and thus they adopted) mixed or nonindigenous racial-ethnic identities (mestizo).

Indigenous demographic and cultural decline persisted into the twentieth century. Development ideology positioned indigenous identities as “traditional” and thus antithetical to modernity, thereby justifying assimilationist policies. Further, challenges to state policies that promoted capitalist modernization were dominated by socialist and labor movements, which disparaged racial-ethnic identities as distractions from class-based struggles. Political shifts toward authoritarian regimes in Latin America from the late 1950s to the early 1970s constituted an additional threat to indigenous peoples, because dictatorships combined policies for national development with a disregard for human rights.

Despite these pressures and the fact that indigenous groups found themselves in the poorest social strata in Latin American societies (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 1994), indigenous mortality rates began to decline. At the same time, even as fertility rates in Latin America have dropped rapidly, indigenous fertility has remained high or declined more slowly (McSweeney and Arp 2005). As a result of high fertility and declining mortality, the size of indigenous tribal populations expanded during the latter half of the twentieth century in much of Latin America (Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía 1994; Gomes 2000; Lovell and Lutz 1994; McSweeney and Arp 2005), as in North America (Nagel 1996).

Some have explained the indigenous population resurgence as the result of a changing international context in the postwar period (Ortíz 1984; Urban and Sherzer 1991). The United Nations (UN) Declaration on Human Rights signaled this shift and led to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the International Labour Organization Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, and growing attention to mistreatment of indigenous groups. This international context fomented pressure for national policy changes to recognize and protect indigenous people, land claims, and cultural practices. National projects predicated on ethnic
homogeneity became less acceptable, and state policies that once involved forced assimilation and ethnic cleansing were curtailed.

**Democratization, Struggles for Citizenship, and Indigenous Social Movements**

That said, demographic processes and international pressures cannot adequately explain Latin America's indigenous population resurgence. For just as changes in racial-ethnic identification help account for the indigenous population decline, racial-ethnic reclassification has been significant for indigenous population resurgence. We therefore follow the lead of scholars who emphasize rapidly changing cultural-political contexts in Latin America, which have in many countries involved racial-ethnic reclassification into indigenous identities. Discussions of recent politics in Latin America cannot avoid the question of democratization alongside neoliberal economic policies, the consequences for struggles for citizenship rights against persistent social exclusion, or the role of new social movements in such struggles, of which indigenous movements are an example.

Authoritarianism in Latin America was followed by democratization in many countries during the 1980s and 1990s (Domínguez and Lowenthal 1996; Roberts 1995). Central to discussions of Latin American democratization are doubts about how complete such transitions will be (Karl 1991; O'Donnell 1994). Such doubts stem from neoliberal policies that call for a smaller state role in providing social services (Gwynne and Kay 2004; Williams 2002). The result has been democratization coupled with persistent social exclusion, that is, the denial of citizenship rights for certain social groups (Gacitúa, Sojo, and Davis 2001; Wood 2005). Democratization thus brought the unmet promise of citizenship rights along with the political space to demand them.

Consequently, there has been considerable attention devoted to the incomplete extension of citizenship rights in Latin America, where civil and social rights have been extended relatively slowly and selectively (Jelin and Hershberg 1996). Significantly, democratization in Latin America occurred at a moment when established social movements, long reliant on class, held much less currency (Colburn 2002; Warren 2004). This circumstance constituted a political arena increasingly filled by an expanding panoply of “new” social movements, such as feminism, environmentalism, and many others (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998; Eckstein 2001; Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley 2003; Foweraker 1995).

In this context, subaltern groups found alternative bases for mobilizing. Among such subalterns are indigenous movements, which engage in racial-ethnic identity politics to overcome the social exclusion of indigenous peoples. Such movements are perhaps best known in countries with proportionally large indigenous populations, such as Bolivia, Ecua-
dor, Guatemala, and Mexico (Nash 2001; Stephen 2002; Wilson, Perrault, and Roper 2003; Yashar 2005), but even in countries with relatively small indigenous populations, such as Argentina and Brazil, one also finds influential indigenous movements (Hernández 2003; Ramos 1998).

Indigenous mobilization in Latin America stimulated considerable research on the political strategies of indigenous movements (Brysk 2000; Langer and Muñoz 2003; Maybury-Lewis 2002; Niezen 2003; Postero and Zamosc 2004; Seider 2002; Van Cott 1994; Warren and Jackson 2002). This work has documented ways in which indigenous movements have valorized indigenous identities as a means to reassert political and territorial claims. In the process, indigenous movements have altered the political, symbolic, and material meanings attached to indigenous identities, which has prompted an increase in populations self-identifying as indigenous. However, the qualitative emphasis in research on indigenous social movements leaves open the question of the quantitative importance of racial-ethnic reclassification for indigenous population resurgence.

THE CASE OF BRAZIL

We focus on Brazil to appraise its indigenous population resurgence. Brazil has been the subject of several important statements on the formation of racial-ethnic identities in multicultural societies (Freyre 1946; Oliveira 1976; Ribeiro 2000). There is considerable research confronting the notion of Brazil as a “racial democracy” with documentation of its racial inequality (Hasenbalg, Munanga, and Schwarz 1998; Telles 2004; Twine 1998). Brazil is also the focus of many ethnographic studies of indigenous groups, far too numerous to cite here. Although indigenous peoples comprise less than 1 percent of the national population, they constitute a distinguishing element of Brazilian national identity (Ramos 1998), and tribal groups hold approximately 10 percent of Brazil’s considerable land area (Instituto Braseleiro de Geografia e Estatística [IBGE] 2000, pt. 1, 154–165).

Indigenous Population Decline and Resurgence in Brazil

As in other parts of the Americas, colonization by Europeans led to indigenous population decline in Brazil. During the colonial period, a combination of disease, raids for indigenous slaves (bandeiras), and “just wars” decimated indigenous populations (Hemming 1978). Whereas the indigenous population upon Portuguese contact in 1500 was about 5 million, by 1800 it had declined to 800,000 (Gomes 2000). After Brazilian independence in 1822, coastal population growth and coffee exports impelled construction of railroads into the interior and led to frontier expansion involving violent conflicts with tribal groups.
During the twentieth century, development ideology justified further frontier expansion, even into the Amazon (Arnaud 1989; Davis 1977; Garfield 2001; Hemming 1987). However, Brazil created the Indian Protection Service (Serviço de Proteção ao Índio, SPI), charged with contacting, pacifying, and assimilating indigenous groups. The SPI and its institutional heir, the National Indian Foundation (Fundação Nacional do Índio, FUNAI), were also mandated to demarcate indigenous territories and provide basic services. Nonetheless, authoritarian development policies, which assimilationist ideology justified and more powerful federal agencies backed, meant that indigenous population decline continued (Ramos 1998). By 1950, Brazil’s indigenous population reached its historical low of approximately 100,000 people, or 2 percent of the precontact indigenous population (Ribeiro 1970).

Since then, indigenous populations have rebounded in dramatic fashion. Despite serious health threats that Brazilian indigenous groups still face (Coimbra, Santos, and Lúcia 2003; Hern 1995), demographic studies have documented high fertility rates, declining mortality rates, and population growth (Coimbra et al. 2002; Early and Peters 2000; Flowers 1994; Gomes 2000; IBGE 2005; Pagliaro, Azevedo, and Santos 2005; Penna 1984).

However, external pressures on indigenous peoples have continued to escalate, leading indigenous groups to organize in new ways (Hemming 2002; Oliveira 1999; Ramos 1998; Urban 1985). During the 1960s, many tribal groups realized that they faced common external threats. The Brazilian Catholic Church, influenced by liberation theology, created the Indigenist Missionary Council (Conselho Indigenista Missionário, CIMI) and the Ecumenical Center for Documentation and Information (Centro Ecumênico de Documentação e Informação, CEDI). Both nongovernmental organizations helped to organize indigenous groups around the country during the 1970s. The ensuing networking led to the emergence of the Union of Indian Nations (União das Nações Indígenas, UNI). As Brazil underwent democratization during the 1980s, the indigenous movement was highly visible through demonstrations in the national capital and lobbying in congressional offices during preparation of the new national constitution. Indigenous peoples also had a strong presence during the constitutional assembly, and the result in 1988 was a constitutional document that recognized the cultural, legal, and territorial rights of indigenous peoples in Brazil.

By the 1990s, Brazil’s indigenous movement had advanced politically but was increasingly contested. The UNI’s leaders became embroiled in political disputes with CIMI over leadership of the national indigenous movement, which led to a split (Ramos 1998). Indigenous organizations refocused on local issues, in part as a result of fragmentation within UNI, but also because of intensifying local threats to indigenous land claims, each with its own particularities (Hemming 2002; Oliveira 1999). Such con-
Conflicts increased due to easier access to indigenous territories in the Amazon as well as new state policies, such as decree law 1775, which made it easier to challenge indigenous land claims and thereby slow demarcation (Schwartzman, Valério Araújo, and Pankararú 1996).

**Indigenous Identity Politics and Posttraditional Indians**

Despite the challenges, the high profile of the indigenous movement in the 1980s exposed ever larger numbers of Brazilians to alternative understandings of race-ethnicity, which valorized indigenous identity. These identity politics prompted many nonindigenous people to identify and mobilize as indigenous. In particular, in the Brazilian Northeast (Oliveira 1999) and Southeast (Warren 2001)—the two regions colonized first, settled most densely by Europeans and Africans, and with the least land left to tribal groups—where indigenous identity politics took hold, people reclassified themselves as indigenous. Such identity shifts have occurred after Brazilians of indigenous descent—but who did not self-identify as indigenous—came into contact with individuals and communities self-identifying as indigenous and who shared similar lifestyles, physical features, histories of persecution, and/or common ancestors (Warren 2001). Exposure to people who valorize indigenous identity, and the realization of shared struggles, prompted racial-ethnic reclassification alongside indigenous mobilization.

Warren (2001) refers to newly identified indigenous people in Brazil as “post-traditional Indians.” These are people of indigenous descent who live in the fragmented remnants of their traditional cultures but for whom those remnants constitute a central reference for their identity. Posttraditional Indians actively seek to rediscover, recuperate, and reinvigorate cultures that conquest and colonization disrupted. It is this orientation that distinguishes posttraditional Indians from non-Indians and often proves infectious, especially given the legal avenue that indigenous identity offers for land acquisition.

Although land is an important factor behind indigenous resurgence, materially reductive analyses are by themselves insufficient for understanding racial-ethnic reclassification as indigenous (Ramos 2003; Warren 2001). The material payoff of indigenous struggle is in certain respects far from clear. For one thing, identifying as indigenous for the sake of making land claims intensifies hostility and physical violence specifically aimed at indigenous groups. Similarly, struggles over land involving indigenous land claims often dramatically heighten labor discrimination against indigenous people.

Gravitation toward indigenous identities in Brazil must therefore also be understood as part of a desire to win full citizenship rights for self-determination. Given the declining effectiveness of class-based move-
ments, indigenous movements and their racial-ethnic identity politics opened social spaces that valorized indigenous identity and thereby modified the political options available to subaltern peoples, in Brazil and elsewhere. This context made indigenous identities seem more habitable, and assertion of indigenous identity became a viable strategy in struggles for citizenship rights.

Indigenous Populations in Brazil’s 1991 and 2000 Censuses

Identity politics and racial-ethnic reclassification raise questions about recent changes in Brazil’s indigenous population. The IBGE, Brazil’s geography and statistical agency, sought to count indigenous people in the 1991 and 2000 demographic censuses. The institute added a new response category, indígena, to a preexisting question on skin color. This prompted methodological doubts about the conceptualization, collection, and reporting of census data on indígenas (Azevedo 1994, 2000; Kennedy and Perz 2000; Silva 1994).

Despite the doubts, the size and distribution of the indígena population enumerated in the 1991 census were similar to estimates from other data sources (Kennedy and Perz 2000). The 1991 census, FUNAI data for indigenous territories (IBGE 1992, 169–181), and Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) estimates for tribal populations (ISA 1998) all indicate 250,000 to 300,000 indígenas in Brazil, most of whom resided in the North region (Amazonia). Similarly, estimates for 2000 cluster around 350,000 indígenas (FUNAI 2005; Gomes 2000, 249–258; Hemming 2002, 636; Ricardo 2000, 10–15). For at least one analyst (Azevedo 2000), the census data are preferable to other sources because they use enumerations rather than rely on estimates.

Then the 2000 census enumeration was published, and showed an indígena population of over 735,000, which implies a growth rate over 10 percent per year during 1991–2000 (IBGE 2002). One explanation for the discrepancy is that the censuses included people living outside tribal territories, even in urban areas, whereas other sources focus on tribal populations (IBGE 2005). But even if nontribal populations were growing at 3.5 percent per year due to demographic processes, as estimated for tribal populations (Gomes 2000, 158), the faster rate of increase that the censuses indicate suggests that indigenous population growth was also due to something in addition to demographic processes. Given the cultural and political context in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America during the 1990s, we concur with other scholars and suggest that the balance is due to racial-ethnic reclassification. The question that remains concerns the relative importance of demographic processes and identity shifts for indigenous population growth, beyond the confines of localized ethnographic studies.
DEMOGRAPHIC PROCESSES AND RACIAL-ETHNIC RECLASSIFICATION

We use the 1991 and 2000 Brazilian census microdata files (IBGE 1996, 2002) to evaluate the relative importance of demographic processes and racial-ethnic reclassification for indigenous population growth during the 1990s. Because the census data refer to the race-ethnic category “indígena,” that is the term we employ throughout the analysis.

Our analysis uses demographic estimation techniques and proceeds in three stages. First, we employ survival ratios, an established approach for assessing racial-ethnic reclassification that accounts for mortality. Second, we use population projections that also incorporate fertility and migration to more broadly appraise the relative importance of demographic processes and racial-ethnic reclassification. The projections also allow for geographic distinctions, to determine whether the importance of reclassification varies among regions. Third, we consider the possible exclusion of tribal populations from the Brazilian census enumerations, alleged by some scholars, for its effect on the importance of racial-ethnic reclassification.

Survival Ratio Analysis

Wood (1991) and Carvalho, Wood, and Andrade (2004) assess racial reclassification in Brazil using census data for two time points and intercensal survival ratios based on mortality estimates. They used data for children ever born and children surviving and employed indirect demographic techniques and model life tables to estimate life expectancies for different racial-ethnic groups. This in turn allows for calculation of intercensal survival ratios (ISRs), which indicate the proportion of each age group in a given racial-ethnic group at the time of a first census (i.e., “time 1”) that should still be alive by a second census (i.e., “time 2”). This provides a basis for surviving the population already born at time 1 to time 2, to arrive at an expected population at time 2. Use of ISRs allows for comparisons of the expected population at time 2 to the population actually observed in the census at time 2. If the observed population exceeds the expected population, one can interpret the difference as indicating net reclassification into that racial-ethnic category, that is, population growth due to racial-ethnic reclassification.

One difficulty with comparisons of multiple censuses is that the quality of coverage may differ, thereby resulting in differential undercount. If undercount is greater in the earlier census, then later populations will appear relatively larger, and estimates of net reclassification will be biased upward. Further, undercount may vary among racial-ethnic groups and is often higher for subaltern groups such as indígenas. Carvalho, Wood, and Andrade (2004) present methods to adjust for differential intercensal
undercount among different racial-ethnic groups. They take the ratio of
the ISR for a given age and racial-ethnic group relative to the overall Bra-
zilian ISR for the same age group. The mean of all age-specific ISR ratios
provides an adjustment factor for that racial-ethnic group. If the adjust-
ment factor equals 1.0, there was no differential undercount; if the adjust-
ment factor rises above 1.0, there was differentially greater undercount
for that racial-ethnic category in the earlier census. Carvalho, Wood, and
Andrade (2004) multiply the adjustment factors by the expected surviving
populations for each age group of the race-ethnic category. This yields
an adjusted expected population at time 2, which can be compared to the
observed population at time 2.

We applied these methods to Brazil’s indígena populations in the 1991
and 2000 Brazilian censuses. We drew on data for male and female chil-
dren ever born and surviving to separately estimate male and female life
expectancies. Because there are few nationwide demographic studies on
Brazilian indígenas, we used two model life tables, the Coale-Demeny
West table, often used when little is known about a population (Coale
and Demeny 1983), and the UN Latin American table, based in part on
Brazilian age patterns of mortality (UN 1982). This allowed us to assess
the importance of different mortality assumptions. We also calculated
adjustment factors to evaluate the impact of differential undercount. To
obtain adjustment factors, we projected Brazil’s 1991 population to 2000
This allowed us to calculate ISR ratios of the indígena to the Brazilian
population for the intercensal interval between 1991 and 2000. Because
there is a nine-year interval between the two censuses, we conducted our
calculations using single-year age groups. We generated unabridged life
table output and applied it to single-year age groups to obtain ISRs for
all ages. We then used the ISRs to survive the 1991 indígena population
in single-year age groups so that, for example, infants (zero-year-olds) in
1991 could be distinguished as nine-year-olds in 2000. We also estimated
the adjustment factors on the basis of single-year age groups and summed
the adjusted single-year age groups to obtain the adjusted expected popu-
lation in 2000. Given the nine-year intercensal interval, we focus on the
population age nine years and older in 2000 for purposes of comparing
observed to expected surviving populations.

Table 1 presents results of the survival ratio analysis. The 1991 census
counted some 294,000 indígenas (row 1), and the 2000 census shows
590,000 indígenas of age nine years and older (row 2). The estimates based
on survival and undercount adjustment vary from 276,000 to 288,000 (row
3), a range of about 12,000 survivors, or 4.3 percent of the lower estimate.
Comparisons of columns 1 and 3 or 2 and 4 show that the choice of model life
table makes a difference of about 4,000 survivors, or 1.4 percent. Similarly,
comparisons of columns 1 and 2 or 3 and 4 indicate that undercount adjustment makes a difference of about 8,000 survivors, or 2.9 percent.\(^1\)

Regardless of model life table or whether we adjust for differential undercount, the results from the survival ratio analysis indicate substantial reclassification into the indígena category between 1991 and 2000. The enumerated population age nine years and older in 2000 (row 2) is substantially larger than the expected population (row 3), yielding relatively large numbers of people who reclassified as indígena (row 4). The population age nine and older that reclassified as indígena between 1991 and 2000 ranges from 301,000 to 313,000. Lower estimates result from using the Latin American model life table and from adjusting for differential undercount. But in all four columns, there is so much reclassification into the indígena category that the reclassified population (row 4) is actually larger than the surviving population (row 3). As a result, the percentage of the population age nine years and older in 2000 that had reclassified between 1991 and 2000 ranges from 51 percent to 53 percent (row 5).\(^2\)

1. The mean ISR ratios used to adjust the surviving indígena populations were about 1.028. This indicates that undercount of indígenas in the 1991 census relative to the 2000 census was slightly higher than that for Brazilians as a whole in the same two censuses.

2. One might object that the large number of reclassified indígenas in 2000 makes the 1991 and 2000 populations different, in ways that would affect estimation of demographic rates for the population. We therefore reran the survival analysis, holding life expectancies constant at their 1991 levels. This assumes no change in life expectancies due to reclassification and implies that mortality rates remained somewhat higher than in the survival runs we present in table 1. But the runs with constant mortality yield slightly smaller surviving populations, which implies larger reclassified populations than presented. In this light, the findings in table 1 could be viewed as somewhat conservative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West (unadjusted)</th>
<th>West (adjusted)</th>
<th>Latin Am. (unadjusted)</th>
<th>Latin Am. (adjusted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Enumerated 1991 population</td>
<td>294,131</td>
<td>294,131</td>
<td>294,131</td>
<td>294,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Enumerated 2000 population, age 9+</td>
<td>590,129</td>
<td>590,129</td>
<td>590,129</td>
<td>590,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Reclassified population (2 − 3)</td>
<td>313,543</td>
<td>305,757</td>
<td>309,485</td>
<td>301,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Percent reclassified (4/3 × 100)</td>
<td>53.13</td>
<td>51.81</td>
<td>52.44</td>
<td>51.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regional Population Projections

In this section, we account for the effects of multiple demographic processes (fertility, mortality, and migration) relative to reclassification for indigenous population resurgence in Brazil. This requires fertility and migration estimation but allows for a broader appraisal of the relative importance of demographic processes and racial-ethnic reclassification for population change among indígenas. This also allows us to disaggregate Brazil into five regions to assess regional differences in the importance of racial-ethnic reclassification.

To estimate fertility, we first compiled the 1991 and 2000 female indígena populations ages fifteen to forty-nine in five-year age groups, along with reported children ever born to women in each of those age groups. We used these data to estimate age-specific and total fertility rates in 1991 and 2000. We incorporated the fertility estimates into population projections alongside the male and female life expectancies from the Latin American model life table. We chose this model life table as it yielded larger surviving populations and more conservative estimates of racial-ethnic reclassification. We did not adjust for differential undercount because this did not change the previous findings substantively, and because the effect of using the Latin American instead of the West model life table is similar to that of accounting for differential undercount. To determine whether reclassification is more important in long-settled regions like the Northeast and Southeast, we ran the analysis for each of Brazil’s five statistical regions: the North, Northeast, Southeast, South, and Center-West. IBGE distinguishes among these regions because of their many historical and socioeconomic differences (IBGE 1991).

We projected the 1991 regional indígena populations to 2000 to obtain expected populations. Because the projections now incorporate fertility, the expected population for a given region refers to the entire indígena population in that region, and not just people age nine years and older. The effect of incorporating fertility is to reduce the relative importance of racial-ethnic reclassification. This is because our method assumes that all children born to indígena women are classified as indígena, which inflates the indígena population base used to calculate reclassification percentages.3

A complication with regional projections is that demographic change occurs not only because of natural increase (e.g., fertility and mortality) but also because of interregional migration. We therefore account for in-

3. There are issues of how people of mixed racial-ethnicity self-identify and how mixed families racially and ethnically identify their children, both of which can affect enumerations of racial-ethnic groups. In the United States, there are high levels of ethnic intermarriage involving indigenous people, yielding complex patterns of ethnic identification in mixed race-ethnicity households (Liebler 2004). This issue deserves further attention in the Brazilian case.
terregional migration among indígenas to distinguish the importance of natural increase, net migration, and reclassification for indígena population growth. Although population projections are often used to estimate net migration indirectly as the residual difference left after accounting for natural increase, we do not have that option in the present analysis. Because we cannot observe racial-ethnic reclassification directly, we must reserve the residual difference for that interpretation and find other methods to estimate net migration.

We therefore employed direct techniques to estimate migration using data from Brazil’s 2000 census question pertaining to place of residence five years earlier. For each region, we compiled the number of indígenas by their state of residence in 1995. We grouped them by their region of residence and tabulated indígenas who resided outside of Brazil in 1995. This allowed for an assessment of the assumption of Brazilian indígenas as a “closed” population nationally. The 2000 census data on migration indicated that 8.6 percent of indígenas (about 63,800) had moved among states since 1995, and of these, less than 3 percent (about 1,800) had resided outside Brazil in 1995. Immigrants thus comprise 0.2 percent of the indígena population enumerated in 2000. We therefore excluded immigrants and treat Brazil’s indígena population as closed at the national level.

Table 2 presents direct estimates of interregional migration among indígenas. The columns indicate region of residence in 1995, and the rows indicate region of residence in 2000. By reading across a given row (the North region), one can see where indígenas were living in 1995 who resided in the North region in 2000, that is, who moved to the North region and from where. About 86 percent of the indígena in-migrants to North region states in 2000 had resided in another northern state in 1995, and the same holds to varying degrees in the other regions. Similarly, by reading down the column for the same region (again, e.g., the North), one can find where indígenas who resided in the North region in 1995 were living at the time of the 2000 census, that is, who moved from the North region and to where. Approximately 71 percent of indígena out-migrants from northern states in 1995 resided in a different northern state in 2000, and similar figures obtain for the other regions. These numbers indicate that most migration among indígenas from 1995 to 2000 was among states within a given region, and not interregional.

The figures off the diagonal in table 2 indicate interregional migration. The rows provide in-migration estimates, and the columns present out-migration estimates. Together, they can be used to calculate interregional net migration as in- minus out-migration. For a given region, one obtains net migration by taking the row total (in-migrants) and subtracting the column total (out-migrants). The resulting net migration estimates appear on the right side of table 2. The North and Northeast regions experienced net losses of indígenas from 1995 to 2000, whereas the other regions
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>6,522</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>10,543</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>1,263</td>
<td>4,118</td>
<td>15,337</td>
<td>685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>9,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-west</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,164</td>
<td>16,260</td>
<td>18,038</td>
<td>10,403</td>
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</table>
experienced net gains. Because this analysis only considers interregional migration within Brazil, the net migration estimates sum to zero for the country as a whole.

These estimates cover only the 1995–2000 period, but the population projections cover the 1991–2000 period. We therefore assumed constant migration during the 1991–2000 period and used a 9/5 inflation factor to extrapolate from the five-year migration interval to the nine-year intercensal interval. This is not ideal, for migration may not be constant and the technique misses repeat migrants. However, the 1991 census provides some evidence of stability in indígena migration rates over time, which suggests that our assumption is not unrealistic. The far-right column in table 2 therefore presents interregional net migration estimates for indígenas in the 1991–2000 period. The estimates suggest some regional redistribution, notably net losses in the Northeast and net gains in the Southeast.

Table 3 presents the results of the population projections. The totals for Brazil appear in the rightmost column. The enumerated indígena population in 1991 was about 294,000 (row 1), and grew to 735,000 in 2000 (row 2), a difference of some 441,000 (row 3). The projected indígena population in 2000 was 387,000 (row 4), which implies an increase of some 93,000 due to natural increase (row 5), or about 21 percent of the total population change (row 6). Note that interregional migration within Brazil (rows 7–8) sums to zero for the country as a whole. This leaves a reclassified population of some 347,000 (row 9), or about 47 percent of the enumerated population in 2000 (row 10), a percentage somewhat lower than those in table 1, as expected. Nonetheless, reclassification accounts for nearly 80 percent of the population change among Brazil’s indígenas during the 1991–2000 period (row 11).

4. The 1991 census includes questions on duration of residence and place of previous residence as well as residence five years before. We used both to estimate migration during 1986–1991 and 1982–1991, that is, five- and nine-year migration intervals. If the rate of migration was constant, then the nine-year estimates should be roughly 1.8 times as large as the five-year estimates (i.e., a 9/5 ratio). The results indicated ratios of 1.6 to 1.8, depending on the region, regardless of whether the nine-year estimates are compared to five-year estimates on the basis of the duration of residence question or the question on residence five years previously. This might indicate some acceleration in indígena migration during the late 1980s, or it might reflect a downward bias in reporting of migration in the early 1980s due to later migration, in which case migration would indeed be roughly constant.

5. One might assert that including reclassified indígenas would lead to rather different populations in 1991 and 2000 for whom we have estimated fertility. We therefore reran the projections holding fertility and mortality constant at their 1991 levels. The results yielded a projected indígena population of 395,202 for Brazil. This is a small change from the findings reported in table 3. The result based on constant fertility and mortality assumptions yields a natural increase of 101,571, or 23 percent of total population growth from 1991 to 2000. That, in turn, implies that indigenous population growth due to racial-ethnic reclassification still amounts to about 77 percent of total population growth.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1991 Population</th>
<th>2000 Population</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Natural Increase</th>
<th>Increase Due to Natural Increase</th>
<th>Net Migration</th>
<th>Increase Due to Net Migration</th>
<th>Reclassified Population</th>
<th>Increase Due to Reclassification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>124,613</td>
<td>213,445</td>
<td>+88,830</td>
<td>+45,832</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>-2,844</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>+45,842</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>55,856</td>
<td>71,570</td>
<td>+114,533</td>
<td>+15,714</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>-6,440</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
<td>+105,259</td>
<td>91.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>30,589</td>
<td>36,676</td>
<td>+132,943</td>
<td>+6,087</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>+7,324</td>
<td>+5.5</td>
<td>+119,532</td>
<td>89.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>30,338</td>
<td>38,382</td>
<td>+53,103</td>
<td>+8,044</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>+605</td>
<td>+1.1</td>
<td>+44,454</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-west</td>
<td>52,742</td>
<td>70,520</td>
<td>+51,618</td>
<td>+17,778</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>+1,355</td>
<td>+2.6</td>
<td>+32,484</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>294,131</td>
<td>387,593</td>
<td>+441,027</td>
<td>+93,455</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>+347,572</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Indígena Reclassification in Brazil Based on Population Projections, 1991–2000, by Region
The other columns in table 3 present figures for Brazil’s five regions. Every region experienced substantial indígena population growth between 1991 and 2000 (row 3), and the projected populations in 2000 (row 4) are substantially smaller, indicating the limited importance of natural increase (row 5). However, this varies by region. The percentage of the total population growth due to natural increase ranges from only 4.6 percent in the Southeast to 51.5 percent in the North (row 6). This begs the question of the importance of interregional net migration (row 7). Although its impact varies among regions, it is never of primary importance. As a percentage of total population change, net migration reaches only –5.6 percent in the Northeast and 5.5 percent in the Southeast (row 8).

As a result, there are large reclassified indígena populations in all regions (row 9). The largest reclassified populations occur in the Northeast and Southeast, both with more than 100,000. Moreover, reclassified indígenas constituted roughly 62 percent of all indígenas in the Northeast in 2000 and 73 percent of all indígenas in the Southeast (row 10). Further, racial-ethnic reclassification accounted for approximately 92 percent of indígena population growth in the Northeast from 1991 to 2000, and 90 percent of the growth in the Southeast (row 11). These findings are consistent with ethnographic documentation of reclassification among specific indigenous groups in the Northeast (Oliveira 1999) and the Southeast (Warren 2001), and suggest that such reclassification occurred elsewhere in those regions. Reclassification percentages are lower in other regions, particularly the North, where reclassified indígenas constituted about 22 percent of all indígenas in 2000 but still accounted for 52 percent of total growth from 1991 to 2000.6 Racial-ethnic reclassification is the primary explanation for indígena population resurgence throughout Brazil in the 1990s because it accounts for most indígena population growth in all regions of the country.

Tribal and Nontribal Indígena Populations

The foregoing analysis leaves untreated another issue, pertaining to census coverage of tribal populations. Hemming (2002, 636–638) suggests that Brazilian censuses do not count tribal indígenas living on indigenous territories, only “detrabialized” indígenas residing elsewhere. However, this is unlikely. The IBGE’s enumerators did visit indigenous territories in many parts of Brazil (Azevedo 1994, 2000; Silva 1994), and 1991 and 2000 census data include population figures for indígenas living in indigenous territories (Pereira, Florido, and Fernandes 2002).

6. Note that negative net migration serves to increase the effective total and residual population change, because positive net migration reduces the effective total and residual change. So in the North region, with negative net migration, both natural increase and racial-ethnic reclassification account for slightly more than 50 percent of the total change.
There are nonetheless reasons to expect gaps in census coverage of indígenas on tribal territories. Many indigenous groups are suspicious of outsiders, making accurate enumerations doubtful (Pereira, Florido, and Fernandes 2002). This is particularly likely on undemarcated tribal territories, not yet formally recognized by the state and thus subject to contestation by outsiders (Schwartzman, Araújo, and Pankararú 1996). In addition, remote parts of northern Brazil harbor uncontacted indigenous groups, which implies that censuses miss some tribal populations (Hemming 2002, 634).

To assess the impacts of excluding tribal indigenous populations from census enumerations on estimates of racial-ethnic reclassification, we gathered population data from FUNAI, which has published lists of all indigenous territories in Brazil. The FUNAI lists with the closest available dates to the 1991 and 2000 censuses refer to 1992 and 1999 (IBGE 1992, 174–181; 2000, pt. 1, 154–165). The FUNAI lists have population estimates rather than enumerations, so they constitute a data source more or less independent of the censuses.

A problem in the FUNAI data is that some tribal territories lack population estimates. To manage this problem, we pursued three options for total population estimation. First, we excluded unreported populations and used the raw figures. Second, we assumed that unreported populations are likely to be selective of small tribal groups, and imputed populations of fifty people on each territory without a reported population figure. Third, we assumed that tribal territories with unreported populations had populations on average the same as territories with reported populations in the same state. We then imputed the median population figure for a given state’s reported tribal populations in all territories with unreported populations in that state. We applied these methods to the 1992 and 1999 FUNAI data, and then summed the estimates for each region for both time points and calculated exponential growth rates during the intervening years. We then extrapolated exponentially using those growth rates from 1992 to 1991 and from 1999 to 2000 so the resulting populations corresponded to census years.

Table 4 presents the findings. The top panel presents the extrapolated 1991 populations by region. All three estimates are low compared to the 1991 census enumeration (294,000) and Hemming’s 1990 estimate of 300,000 (2002, 636), but the second imputation is the closest, at about 253,000. The bottom panel shows the extrapolated 2000 populations. Again, the second imputation (about 351,000) is closest to Hemming’s 2000 estimate of 350,000 (2002, 636). We therefore use the population estimates from the second imputation.

To assess the impacts of limited or lacking census coverage of tribal populations, we pursued three estimates of reclassification based on different assumptions. First, we treated the census as a complete count. This
is in contrast to Hemming’s (2002) argument that the census did not count tribal populations. Methodologically, we ignored the FUNAI population estimates, as was done in the preceding analysis, reported in table 3. Because we excluded the FUNAI population estimates, the total indígena population is only based on the census figures, yielding a smaller denominator for calculating reclassification percentages, which in turn yields a “high” estimate of the importance of reclassification. These percentages are likely to be too high, because the censuses likely undercounted tribal indígenas and missed uncontacted groups.

Therefore, a second approach adds the entire population on indigenous territories to the census enumerations. This is in line with Hemming’s (2002) argument that the censuses excluded all tribal populations and expands the indígena population by some 252,000 in 1991 and to 351,000 in 2000. This also assumes that tribal indígenas did not reclassify during the 1991–2000 interval (i.e., that all population growth on tribal territories was entirely due to natural increase). These assumptions yield the most conservative possible appraisal of the importance of reclassification because they add to the indígena population base without adding any reclassified indígenas, thereby yielding “low” reclassification percentages.

Table 5 shows the results of the Hemming assumption of no census coverage of tribal populations. We present the census enumerations (rows 1a and 2a) as well as FUNAI estimates (rows 1b and 2b), employing the figures from the second imputation method. Adding these figures together yields a total indígena population of about 547,000 in 1991 (row 1c) and...
Table 5  Indígena Reclassification in Brazil, 1991–2000, Assuming All Tribal Populations Are Excluded from Censuses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Northeast</th>
<th>Southeast</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Center-west</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a. Enumerated 1991 population</td>
<td>124,613</td>
<td>55,856</td>
<td>30,589</td>
<td>30,338</td>
<td>52,742</td>
<td>294,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b. 1991 tribal population</td>
<td>109,579</td>
<td>59,944</td>
<td>8,356</td>
<td>27,470</td>
<td>47,255</td>
<td>252,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c. Total population (1a + 1b)</td>
<td>234,192</td>
<td>115,800</td>
<td>38,945</td>
<td>57,808</td>
<td>99,997</td>
<td>546,741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a. Enumerated 2000 population</td>
<td>213,443</td>
<td>170,389</td>
<td>163,532</td>
<td>83,441</td>
<td>104,360</td>
<td>735,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b. 2000 tribal population</td>
<td>156,828</td>
<td>73,361</td>
<td>11,907</td>
<td>30,781</td>
<td>78,596</td>
<td>351,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c. Total population (2a + 2b)</td>
<td>370,272</td>
<td>243,750</td>
<td>175,439</td>
<td>114,222</td>
<td>182,955</td>
<td>1,086,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Population change (2c − 1c)</td>
<td>+136,080</td>
<td>+127,950</td>
<td>+136,494</td>
<td>+56,415</td>
<td>+82,959</td>
<td>+539,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Projected 2000 population plus 2000 tribal population</td>
<td>327,273</td>
<td>144,931</td>
<td>48,583</td>
<td>69,163</td>
<td>149,116</td>
<td>739,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Natural increase (4 − 1c)</td>
<td>+93,081</td>
<td>+29,131</td>
<td>+9,638</td>
<td>+13,56</td>
<td>+49,119</td>
<td>+192,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Net migration, 1991–2000</td>
<td>−2,844</td>
<td>−6,440</td>
<td>−7,324</td>
<td>+605</td>
<td>+1,355</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Reclassified population (3 − 5 − 6)</td>
<td>+45,842</td>
<td>+105,259</td>
<td>+119,532</td>
<td>+44,454</td>
<td>+32,484</td>
<td>+347,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. % who reclassified (7/2 × 100)</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. % of increase due to reclassification (7/3 × 100)</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1,087,000 in 2000 (row 2c). With the same mortality, fertility, and migration assumptions for the enumerated population, we then arrived at the same figure for reclassification (about 347,500) for all of Brazil, but then recalculated reclassification percentages using the new indígena population figures (row 2c) and estimates of population growth (row 3). The percentage of indígenas who reclassified drops to about 32 percent and ranges from 12 percent in the North region to 68 percent in the Southeast. The percentage of indígena population growth due to reclassification is still 64 percent, ranging from 33 percent in the North to 87 percent in the Southeast. However, the assumptions motivating table 5 are dubious, because census enumerators did visit indigenous territories (Pereira, Florido, and Fernandes 2002), and because people living on tribal territories have reclassified themselves as indígenas (Warren 2001).

We therefore pursued a third and final set of assumptions about census coverage of tribal territories. Specifically, we assumed that the censuses covered all tribal territories except those in the North region, which is the most remote in Brazil and includes all uncontacted tribal groups. We therefore added populations on tribal territories to the census enumerations of the North region, but not the other regions. This is in line with the work of Hemming (2002) but only for the North region, and it yields a middle estimate of the reclassification percentage.

The results appear in table 5 (for the North region) and table 3 (for all other regions). Rather than present another table, we report totals for Brazil here. The indígena population was 404,000 in 1991 and 892,000 in 2000. The percentage of indígenas who reclassified is 39 percent, and the percentage of indígena population growth from 1991 to 2000 due to reclassification is 71 percent. These figures fall between the high estimates of 47 percent and 79 percent, respectively, in table 3, and the low estimates of 32 percent and 64 percent in table 5. But it is likely that the middle estimates are still too low, because they assume no census coverage in the North region. Even in the most remote Brazilian state of Amazonas, which has the largest indigenous population of any state, the 2000 census found 101,000 indígenas on tribal lands (Pereira et al. 2002). By comparison, the “second imputation” estimate of tribal indígenas in that state in 2000 is only 88,000. This suggests that the “high” figures in table 3 are likely the closest to actual fact, if a bit high due to some missed tribal groups and no adjustment for differential undercount.

IMPLICATIONS OF RACIAL-ETHNIC RECLASSIFICATION

Our findings indicate that reclassified indígenas constitute nearly half (approximately 47 percent) of Brazil’s indígena population in 2000, and reclassification accounts for most (approximately 79 percent) indígena population growth in Brazil during the 1990s. Adjustments due to dif-
ferential undercount and uncontacted groups would reduce these figures, but modestly. Thus, it is not enough to focus on demographic processes as an explanation for indigenous population resurgence. Just as the plasticity of racial-ethnic identities reduced indigenous populations during the colonial period, racial-ethnic reclassification can also expand indigenous populations, as in Brazil during the 1990s.

These findings raise questions for further research on racial-ethnic reclassification. Most ethnographic work on indigenous groups focuses on rural areas. But Brazil’s demographic censuses indicate very rapid indigenous population growth in urban areas, from 71,025 in 1991 to 384,503 in 2000 (IBGE 1996, 2002). This implies that a large proportion of racial-ethnic reclassification as indígena occurred in urban areas. Initial analysis of indígenas in Brazil in 1991 and 2000 suggests socioeconomic differences among rural and urban areas, such that urban indígenas were better educated and that the differential persisted over time (IBGE 2005). This raises questions for further research on the socioeconomic composition of rural and urban indígenas in Brazil.

Another issue concerns the ability of indigenous movements to continue to expand indigenous populations in the Americas via identity politics. Crucial questions remain to be answered as to who is reclassifying and what the limit is for self-identified indigenous populations. One scenario follows Warren (2001) and implies that indigenism and identification as indigenous are mutually reinforcing, such that indigenous movements prompt racial-ethnic reclassification in the future, yielding ever-larger indigenous populations. However, indigenous resurgence is but one of several possible outcomes of identity politics. Another possibility involves nationalist mestizaje, whereby mestizo identities are valorized instead, thereby reducing indigenous populations (De la Cadena 2000; Hooker 2005).

Racial-ethnic reclassification itself raises questions about the meaning of what it is to be indígena, in Brazil and elsewhere. Brazil is well known for having more than two hundred distinct tribal ethnicities and nearly as many indigenous languages (FUNAI 2005; Gomes 2000; Ricardo 2000). If more people of mixed descent reclassify themselves as indigenous, the complexity of indigenous identities will grow. In turn, identity politics raise many issues for the political fortunes of indigenous movements. Posttraditional Indians may or may not be accepted, not only by indigenous communities less unsettled by conquest but also by mainstream Latin American societies. There remain many tropes and clichés surrounding indigenous identity in Brazil (Ramos 1998; Warren 2001), and urban, newly self-identifying indigenous people may not win the political support accorded to isolated and culturally distinct indigenous tribes.
This question bears implications for Indian policy and the attainment of full citizenship rights for indígenas. If posttraditional indígenas become a majority among indigenous peoples in Brazil, Indian policy will face adjustments because large proportions of the indigenous population will be assimilated into Brazilian society, but recently self-identified as indígena and newly occupying a cultural and political position that involves struggles to overcome social exclusion. This raises questions as to how state Indian policy will respond to demographic changes, even as Indian policy increasingly focuses on issues of indigenous health and education, which are related to social inclusion. Even with state policy shifts, continued racial-ethnic reclassification and indigenous population growth may not overcome indigenous social exclusion, at least in the short term, because of political complexities surrounding posttraditional indigenous identification and questions concerning the meaning of identifying as indígena.

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